Who owns reality? Part 9

In the autumn of 1986, Statoil stood at a crossroads. After years of preparation, production began on Gullfaks – the company’s first major field as operator. What was meant to be a triumph was quickly overshadowed by a dramatic drop in oil prices. A large operations organization had to be restructured, and Gullfaks was hit particularly hard. Trust between employees and management suffered a serious blow – a crisis that would take years to mend. 

A story in nine parts. 

Safety in a Shared Reality

By the late 1990s, the Norwegian oil industry had developed a self-image of safety standards that was not shared by either the Petroleum Directorate or the trade unions. While the industry claimed that safety had never been better, authorities and labor organizations pointed to increasing risks and a lack of control.

In the year 2000, two serious fatal accidents occurred on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. One happened during a crane operation on Oseberg Øst; the other occurred on an anchor-handling vessel, where a deck worker was killed after being struck by a chain. The Petroleum Directorate reacted strongly, linking the incidents to a rising risk level in the petroleum sector.

In its 2000 annual report, the Directorate expressed concern over a trend in which violations of regulations and procedures had become part of daily practice—and were being accepted. It concluded that company leadership had failed in fostering a strong safety culture.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Oljedirektoratet. (2001). Oljedirektoratets årsberetning. Norsk sokkel 2000. s.4.

This recognition came after a prolonged crisis of trust between the key stakeholders in the industry. Perceptions of reality were divided: the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF, now Offshore Norge) claimed that safety had never been better, citing low numbers of personal injuries. The unions, however, argued that safety was no better than it had been in the 1970s. The Directorate pointed out that the number of gas leaks was increasing, and that a low number of personal injuries did not necessarily indicate a low risk of major accidents—quite the opposite.

Toward a Common Understanding

In 2000, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) took the initiative to establish the Safety Forum, a tripartite collaboration between authorities, employers, and employees. The forum had no authority to make binding decisions but served as a platform for dialogue and cooperation on health, safety, and environment (HSE) issues in the oil and gas industry.

The challenge was that the parties still held differing views on the state of safety. There was a need for a shared language and a common factual foundation. This marked the beginning of a significant shift.

In 2001, the first report from the Risk Level in the Norwegian Petroleum Industry (RNNP) project was published. This pilot study mapped the risk level on the Norwegian Continental Shelf for the period 1996–2001. The report combined qualitative assessments with quantitative data and analysis, becoming a key tool in establishing a shared understanding of the safety situation.

That same year, the Collaboration for Safety program was launched. It brought together industry and labor representatives to address incidents with high risk potential. The program was an important acknowledgment that the situation was not satisfactory and helped establish a common perception of reality. The results were so clear that no serious actor could ignore them.

The Petroleum Directorate expressed satisfaction with the development. In its Norwegian Shelf 2000 annual report, it stated that the findings provided a basis for getting the industry to acknowledge that the safety developments in recent years had been far from acceptable.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Oljedirektoratet. (2001). Oljedirektoratets årsberetning. Norsk sokkel 2000. s.53.

A Clearer Division—and a Strengthened HSE Regime

In 2004, the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) was established as a separate agency, split off from the Petroleum Directorate. The PSA was given responsibility for safety and the working environment, while the Directorate continued as the resource management authority. This division clarified roles and strengthened HSE efforts by ensuring that safety issues received the necessary attention and resources.

Safety work on the Norwegian Continental Shelf is a continuous effort—an ongoing project that is never truly complete. A well-functioning tripartite collaboration is essential for the Norwegian HSE regime to succeed. But from time to time, reports emerge indicating that this cooperation is under pressure. Because safety is perishable, trust between the parties must be maintained—and taken seriously when it is challenged.