Code red – part 5. Culture clash and crisis of trust
In the wake of the 2010 gas blowout on Gullfaks C, conflict between company management and the trade unions intensified. The incident was the third critical situation in the same well within five months, and Statoil faced strong criticism from several quarters. The environmental NGO Bellona voiced serious concern about safety standards on Statoil’s installations, and leader Frederic Hauge accused the company of having deprioritised safety and the environment over time. He argued that warnings which should have led to a shutdown had been ignored and called for a police investigation into the company’s practices.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Klikk her for å endre…
The Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) shared many of these concerns. In a letter to licensee Petoro on 21 June 2010, the authority described the incident as very serious—both in isolation and in light of earlier well-control problems on Gullfaks. The PSA asked for a holistic assessment of the situation and required Statoil’s evaluation of whether it was prudent to continue drilling.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Klikk her for å endre…
Within the labour movement, the union SAFE—represented by deputy leader Roy Erling Furre—was particularly outspoken. He pointed to an IRIS research report concluding that Statoil’s behaviour-based safety systems had significant weaknesses. The report argued that management focused too much on restructuring and finances and too little on safety management and operations. IRIS further highlighted that downsizing, staff rotation and a weakened safety representative system had reduced operational competence offshore, with negative consequences for safety. It also criticised a culture where errors were explained by employees’ lack of motivation or will, pushing responsibility downward. Many employees felt production and cost targets were prioritised over safety and the working environment. Furre’s message to CEO Helge Lund was blunt: listen.[REMOVE]
Fotnote: Klikk her for å endre…
Conflicts between unions and management were particularly pronounced on Gullfaks, which had developed a strong local identity and a distinct drilling culture. Employees identified strongly with the field and their colleagues, and a self-reliant operational practice had evolved largely independent of the company’s central management systems. The PSA questioned whether the Gullfaks organisation was sufficiently integrated into Statoil as a whole. Historically, the unions SAFE (formerly OFS) and NOPEF competed for influence in Statoil’s offshore organisation. SAFE, with its activist approach and strong base in drilling and well, dominated on Gullfaks, while LO-affiliated unions were stronger in Hydro.[REMOVE]
Fotnote: Boon, M. (2022). Statoil og Equinor: 2: En nasjonal kjempe: etter 2001 (R. R. Moen, Tran.; Vol. 2). Universitetsforlaget.s. 294 og Meland, Trude. (ABC – fra husforening til LO. Industriminne Valhall. Norsk Oljemuseum. https://valhall.industriminne.no/nb/abc-fra-husforening-til-loAfter the Gullfaks C incident, the conflict escalated further. SAFE and the union Lederne openly criticised Statoil’s management, while other unions—Industri Energi, NITO and Tekna—accused SAFE of using the situation as a power struggle to regain influence offshore. As one Industri Energi representative put it, there was a union power struggle on the Norwegian shelf.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Ole K. Helgesen, Mailken Ree. Tenisk Ukeblad. 3. februar 2012. Nito og IE bør innrømme feil
Trust between unions and company leadership deteriorated further. Industri Energi, which had previously supported management, now called for CEO Helge Lund to step down. The conflict culminated in 2012 with the largest strike on the Norwegian shelf since the early 2000s, triggered by dissatisfaction with Statoil’s reform of the early retirement scheme. Offshore workers lost the benefit while leadership retained it—widely perceived as a major worsening of conditions and a symbol of management’s distance from offshore staff.
The road ahead
In response to criticism and the serious incidents, Statoil launched several measures to strengthen governance and safety culture. The company signalled that management systems would be simplified, bureaucracy reduced, and leaders given clearer training in responsibilities and authority. It also expressed an ambition to revitalise corporate values and foster a more open and considerate culture, where safety and the working environment are recognised as prerequisites for sustainable operations.
The Gullfaks incident showed that technical barriers alone are insufficient without an organisation that understands and respects the social and cultural mechanisms that shape safety work. The Statoil–Hydro merger exposed a range of organisational weaknesses, where cultural clashes, loss of competence and weakened trust between management and employees undermined the company’s ability to manage risk.[REMOVE]
Fotnote: Equinor. (2011.19. desember) Tiltak etter Gullfaks-hendelsen. Tiltak etter Gullfaks-hendelsen – equinor.com